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COMMENTS
CREATING THE LEGAL MONSTER: THE EXPANSION
AND EFFECT OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY IN
NORTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCTION
It was on a dreary night of November that I beheld the accom-
plishment of my toils. . . saw the dull yellow eye of the creature
open; it breathed hard, and a convulsive motion agitated its
limbs... His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and
arteries beneath; his hair was of lustrous black, and flowing; his
teeth of pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a
more horrid contrast with his watery eyes... his shrivelled com-.
plexion and straight black lips... but now that I had finished, the
beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust
filled my heart. Unable to endure the aspect of the being that I
had created, I rushed out of the room...1
Malpractice. Like no other word, it doubles attorneys over in
nauseated, gorge-bloated spasms of anxiety. The stigma the word
carries is a powerful combination of personal, public, and profes-
sional humiliation.2 Over the last twenty years, legal malpractice
1. MARY WOLLESTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN OR THE MODERN
PROMETHEUS 48-49 (1831). The theme of her novel is man's inability to control
what he cannot understand. Namely, the power of creation. Id. This situation
seems analogous to legal malpractice. Attorneys themselves create malpractice
through their own actions, yet they fail to understand the great power that they
wield. Attorneys hold the power of creation but cannot control it. At one time in
the past, an attorney hurt a client, and the client sued him for it. Thus, the
process began. See Stephens v. White, 2 Wash. 203 (Va. 1796)(the first recorded
legal malpractice action in the US).
2. See HOWARD C. SNIDER, JR., M.D. JURY OF MY PEERS: A SURGEONS
ENCOUNTER WITH THE MALPRACTICE CRISIS (1989).
1
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has evolved into its own substantive area of law.3 In short, this
Frankenstein creature has taken on a life of its own.
Why a Frankenstein? As in any body of law, the theories of
liability carry out the vital functions, similar to internal organs.
Liability rising out of legal services rests on distinctly separate
theories.4 Attorneys have sutured these separate organs and
entrails together with common factual patterns; their own conduct
creating the life force beneath the single skin called legal malprac-
tice.5 Standing firmly on civil damages, this trunk's limbs are
becoming more powerful; their Herculean strength pushing the
effects of legal malpractice outward.
Since the 1970's, the frequency of legal malpractice actions in
the United States has skyrocketed.6 On average, attorneys can
expect three malpractice claims against them during their
careers.7 Lawyers Mutual of North Carolina, a major malpractice
insurer, reported a five-fold increase in their reported claims
between 1979 and 1990.8
3. JEFFREY M. SMITH & RONALD E. MALLEN, PREVENTING LEGAL
MALPRACTICE § 1.6 (1989). Many procedural matters governing legal malpractice
claims are still developing. Id.
4. See SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 3, § 1.1.
5. See SHELLEY, supra note 1, at 44-47. Frankenstein discovered the power
of life and creation by examining corpses and observing them decay. He then
fashioned his creature from parts of purloined cadavers. Id.
6. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 3, § 1.6, fig. 1, at 18-19. For statistical data
on high malpractice risk areas of law see SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 3, § 1.7,
nn. 4, 6, 7 (citing American Bar Association, Profile of Legal Malpractice: A
Statistical Study of Determinative Characteristics of Claims Asserted Against
Attorneys (1986)). The study showed malpractice claims by area of law (28% in
personal injury, 23% in real estate, 10% in bankruptcy, 8% in family law, 7%
estates, 5% business/corporate, 3% in criminal law, and 16% in other areas), by
activity (53% in litigation, 21% in document preparation, 5% for title opinions,
1% for advice, 10% from other activity), and by alleged error (44% substantive,
26% administrative, 16% client relations, 12% intentional wrongs, and other
errors at 2%). Some type of calendaring error was involved in almost 25% of
claims. Id.
7. NANCY BYERLY JONES, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, LAwYERS'
MANAGEMENT AssISTANCE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT MANUAL 54 (1994). Ms. Jones
is the Director and Management Counsel for the North Carolina State Bar
Lawyers' Management Assistance Program and an adjunct professor at the
Campbell University School of Law, where she teaches Legal Malpractice and
Risk Management.
8. Robert J. Robinson, The Quest for Lawyer Competence to Avoid
Malpractice 6 (1991)(CLE article on file with Nancy Byerly Jones of the NC State
Bar)(citing Lawyers Mutual of North Carolina's Annual Report for 1990). Note
that the figures are for the number of claims filed with Lawyers Mutual for legal
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In North Carolina, this push has expanded the likelihood of
attorney liability and affected the business forms legal practices
take.9 The redefinition of duties, longer period of potential liabil-
ity, and the advent of new claims for damages make it more
advantageous for firms to move from partnerships into Limited
Liability Partnerships and Professional Limited Liability Compa-
nies, which at first glance offer more malpractice protection. 10
This comment will examine the existing and changing law of legal
malpractice exclusively in North Carolina. But to grasp these
changes, the various existing theories of malpractice liability need
to be examined.
II. ORGANS AND ENTRAILS: THEORIES OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE IN
NORTH CAROLINA
At the heart of this creature lie the commonalities that all the
malpractice theories share. Each theory involves the following: 1.
a duty, 2. a breach of that duty, and 3. damages to the plaintiff
proximately caused by the breach. 1 North Carolina courts pres-
ently recognize negligence,' 2 breach of contract,' 3 fraud,'4 con-
malpractice in North Carolina for that period and are not the number of legal
malpractice actions filed in North Carolina for that same period. Id.
9. See generally Micheal S. Hawley, Professional Entity Selection, 'Notes
Bearing Interest, Jan. 1994, at 11, 16; Richard C. Reuben, Added Protection,
ABA JouRNAL, Sept. 1994, 54-57; Micheal B. Abel, North Carolina Limited
Liability Company Act, NoTEs BEARING INTEREST, Oct. 1993, at 6, 7. The authors
provide good discussions of the other advantage behind alternatives to
professional corporations and partnerships: tax advantages. This goes beyond
the scope of the malpractice discussion.
10. See infra notes 75, 76, 173, and 184 and accompanying text. See also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55B-9 (b) (1993). Shareholders in a professional corporation are no
longer joint and severally liable for professional negligence of other shareholders.
This is beyond the scope of the comment.
11. See Hargett v. Holland, 337 N.C. 651, 447 S.E.2d 784 (1994); Rorrer v.
Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355 (1985); Booher v. Frue, 98 N.C. App. 570,
394 S.E.2d 816 (1990); Insurance Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 244 S.E.2d 177
(1978). See SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 3, § 1.1.
12. See Rorrer, 313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355; Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517,
80 S.E.2d 144 (1954).
13. See Broyhill v. Aycock & Spence, 102 N.C. App. 382, 402 S.E.2d 167
(1991), aff'd per curiam, 330 N.C. 438, 410 S.E.2d 392 (1991); Bamberger v.
Bernholz, 96 N.C. App. 555, 386 S.E.2d 450 (1989), rev'd 326 N.C. 589, 391
S.E.2d 192 (1990); United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 263 S.E.2d
313 (1980); Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 244 S.E.2d 177.
1996]
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structive fraud (i.e., breach of fiduciary duty),15  statutory
liability,16 and agency1 7 as valid malpractice theories. Negligence,
breach of contract, fraud, and constructive fraud are often pled
together.' 8
A. Negligence
Factual examination of North Carolina case law shows two
categories of negligence actions: 1. negligence in litigation (i.e.,
litigatory negligence), and 2. negligence in transactions (i.e.,
transactional negligence). ' A plaintiff alleging attorney negli-
gence must show that the attorney owed the plaintiff a duty,
breached that duty, and that the breach proximately caused dam-
age to the plaintiff.20 Hodges v. Carter21 enumerated the attor-
ney's duty (or standard of care) as follows:
Ordinarily when an attorney engages in the practice of the law
and contracts to prosecute an action in behalf of his client, he
14. See Booher, 98 N.C. App. 570, 394 S.E.2d 816 ; Webster v. Powell, 98 N.C.
App. 432, 391 S.E.2d 204 (1990); Brantley v. Dunstan, 17 N.C. App. 19, 193
S.E.2d 423 (1972).
15. See Booher, 98 N.C. App. 570, 394 S.E.2d 816; Webster, 98 N.C. App. 432,
391 S.E.2d 204; Bumgarner, 92 N.C. App. 571, 375 S.E.2d 520.
16. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (j) (1989); 18 U.S.C.A §§ 1961-1968 (1970); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 11 (1993);
N.C. GEN.'STAT. § 75D-2 (1990).
17. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-43 to 59-45 (1993); Forbes Homes, Inc. v.
Trimpi, 318 N.C. 473, 349 S.E.2d 852 (1986); Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A.,
286 N.C. 24, 209 S.E.2d 795 (1974); Investors Title Insurance Co. v. Herzig, 101
N.C. App. 127, 398 S.E.2d 659 (1990).
18. See Bamberger v. Bernholz, 96 N.C. App. 555, 386 S.E.2d 450 (1989),
rev'd, 326 N.C. 589, 391 S.E.2d. 192 (1990).
19. See Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355 (1985)(alleged
negligence in medical malpractice litigation); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80
S.E.2d 144 (1954)(alleged negligence in insurance litigation); Hargett v. Holland,
111 N.C. App. 200, 431 S.E.2d 784 (1993)(Hodges standard applies to will
drafting); Broyhill v. Aycock & Spence, 102 N.C. App. 382, 402 S.E.2d 167
(1991)(alleged negligence in real estate closing). This distinction is clearly stated
by courts, although the two categories have never been expressly named
"litigatory" or "transactional" until this comment. It is not uncommon for
attorneys to try to lump all negligence actions into one category as transactional.
This is clearly wrong. The distinction between litigatory and transactional
negligence becomes critical in malpractice actions due to the additional burden of
proof the plaintiff carries in litigatory negligence cases. See infra notes 24-32
and accompanying text.
20. Rorrer, 313 N.C. 338, 366, 329 S.E.2d 355, 366 (1985).
21. 239 N.C. at 519-20, 80 S.E.2d at 145-46.
124 [Vol. 18:121
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impliedly represents that (1) he possesses the requisite degree of
learning, skill, and ability necessary to the practice of his profes-
sion and which others similarly situated ordinarily possess; (2) he
will exert his best judgment in the prosecution of the litigation
entrusted to him; and (3) he will exercise reasonable and ordinary
care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of
his knowledge to his client's cause.22
This standard applies to negligence in litigation and negligence in
transactions.2 3
However, Rorrer v. Cooke24 made it very difficult for plaintiffs
to win litigatory negligence cases by requiring them to show the
following: 1. the original, underlying claim was valid; 2. the judg-
ment would have been in their favor; and 3. the judgment would
have been collectible. 25 What results is a de facto trial within a
trial, where the plaintiff must literally win the original, underly-
ing case to win the encompassing malpractice case.26 Due to that
test, the plaintiff in litigatory negligence cases is almost always
the client.2 7 As a result, the defendant-attorneys accused of liti-
gatory negligence will be able to plead any defense available to the
original defendants in the underlying case.2 s
22. Id. The court went on to say that an attorney who acts in good faith and
in an honest belief that his advice and acts are well founded and in the best
interests of his client is not answerable for a mere error of judgment or for a
mistake in a point of law which has not been settled by the court of last resort'in
his State and on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed
lawyers. Id. However, the court did express when an attorney is liable:
Conversely, he is answerable in damages for any loss to his client which
proximately results from a want of degree of knowledge and skill ordinarily
possessed by others of his profession similarly situated, or from the omission to
use reasonable care and diligence, or from the failure to exercise in good faith
his best judgment in attending to the litigation committed to his care. Id.
23. See supra note 19.
24. 313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355 (1985).
25. Id. at 361, 329 S.E.2d 355, 369 (1985).
26. Id.; See also Bamberger v. Bernholz, 96 N.C. App 555, 386 S.E.2d 450
(1989), rev'd, 326 N.C. 589, 391 S.E.2d 192 (1990)(plaintiff's original claim was
not legally valid, so he could not prevail in litigatory negligence); Rorrer, 313
N.C. at 361, 329 S.E.2d at 369. In the "trial within a trial" test, the plaintiff has
to show but/for the defendant's negligence, he would have won the original case,
and then show that the judgment could have been collected. So even if but/for is
shown, the plaintiff can still lose if the judgment would not have been collectable
or he cannot show it would have been collectable. Id.
27. Rorrer, 313 N.C. at 361, 329 S.E.2d at 369.
28. Bamberger, 326 N.C. 589, 391 S.E.2d 192. The Supreme Court reversed
the intermediate appellate decision at 96 N.C. App. 555, 386 S.E.2d 450 (1989)
1996]
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On the other hand, negligent transactions are easier to win
because the Rorrer "trial within a trial" test 29 does not apply.
30
But to determine liability, the Hodges standard of care3 1 is still
used.32 Both clients and non-clients may recover here.33 For a
non-client to recover, he must pass a balancing test in addition to
proving negligence.34 He must also allege a non-client, non-privity
relation to the attorney at the outset. 35 A good example of non-
client recovery is found in the estate planning area. Attorneys
who draft defective wills are usually found liable to harmed bene-
ficiaries for negligence.36
B. Breach of Contract
Whether malpractice rises from negligence or contract has
been long debated.3 7 The two theories are often pled at the same
time.3 8 The contract theory rises out of the attorney-client rela-
tionship.39 Contracts here are either express or implied, but few
for the reasons in Judge Lewis's dissent. The original claim of the plaintiff had
no legal validity, and the defendant-attorneys showed that at the malpractice
trial.
29. Rorrer, 313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355. See supra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text.
30. Patrick v. Ronald Williams, P.A., 102 N.C. App. 355, 402 S.E.2d 452
(1991). The court made it clear that cases that do not go to trial, due to attorney
negligence or settlement or some other cause, do not qualify as litigatory
negligence. The court noted that the "trial within a trial" rule stated the case
had to have been lost at trial due to negligence. Id. So it follows that any non-
litigated case or matter will fall under transactional negligence.
31. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 19.
33. United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 263 S.E.2d 313 (1980).
34. Id. at 406-07, 263 S.E.2d at 318. The court balances various factors: (1)
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the other person; (2)
the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that he suffered
injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury; (5) the moral blame attached to such conduct; and (6) the policy of
preventing future harm. Id.
35. Id.; See Broyhill v. Aycock & Spence, 102 N.C. App. 382, 402 S.E.2d 167
(1991).
36. See Hargett v. Holland, 111 N.C. App. 200, 431 S.E.2d 784 (1993).
37. See Insurance Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 244 S.E.2d 177 (1978).
38. See Broyhill, 102 N.C. App. 382, 402 S.E.2d 167; Webster v. Powell, 98
N.C. App. 432, 391 S.E.2d 204 (1990); Bamberger v. Bernholz, 96 N.C. App. 555,
386 S.E.2d 450 (1989), rev'd, 326 N.C. 589, 391 S.E.2d 192 (1990).
39. 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.4
(3d ed. 1989). See also Corceller v. Brooks, 347 So.2d 274 (La. App.
1977)(attorney sued for breach of warranty for guaranteeing a specific result in
126 [Vol. 18:121
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attorneys make express contracts with clients, so most actions are
based on implied contracts.40
The few express contract disputes that do arise often involve
the attorney's fee agreement or contracts between title insurers
and certifying attorneys. 41 The standard of care an attorney must
use may be altered through the written agreement.4 2 Contract
principles, instead of tort theories, apply in express contract
actions.43 Breaches occur when the attorney violates the written
agreement in some way.
Liability in implied contract cases is based upon the negli-
gence standard of care enumerated in Hodges, which is a term
implied upon the parties in the absence of an expressly stated
standard of care.4 4 The attorney, by his consent to represent the
client, has impliedly promised to use the legal standard of care
used in negligence actions throughout the representation.45
North Carolina courts have noted that liability results from the
negligent performance of this implied contract term.46
Additionally, non-clients may recover for a breach of contract
if they can show they were a third party beneficiary.47 Again, the
non-client must allege a non-client, non-privity relation to the
attorney at the outset.48
representation). It is possible for attorneys to create an express warranty by
guaranteeing a client a particular result. Id.
40. 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRAcTIcE § 8.4
(3d ed. 1989).
41. See Broyhill, 102 N.C. App. 382, 402 S.E.2d 167; Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284,
244 S.E.2d 177.
42. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 39, § 8.4.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 8.5. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Implied contract
actions in North Carolina use the Hodges standard of care to determine
negligence. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. In implied
contractual negligence cases arising out of litigation, the Rorrer "trial within a
trial" test is still applied. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Broyhill v. Aycock & Spence, 102 N.C. App. 382, 402 S.E.2d 392
(1991); Insurance Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 244 S.E.2d 177 (1978).
47. United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 405-06, 263 S.E.2d 313,
317 (1980). After properly showing negligence and alleging a non-privity claim,
the non-client will have to show the following:
(1) that there was a contract between two other people; (2) that it was a
valid and enforceable contract; and (3) the contract was entered into not
for the non-client's indirect benefit, but for his direct benefit. Id.
48. Id.
1996] 127
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C. Fraud
An attorney who commits fraud is liable for malpractice. Lia-
bility rests if the plaintiff shows the attorney did the following: 1.
made a false representation or concealed a material fact, 2. which
was reasonably calculated to deceive, 3. and made to deceive, 4.
and which does deceive, 5. damaging the plaintiff.49 While other
states have extended liability for fraud to non-clients,50 no North
Carolina cases have done so. Plaintiffs must also plead fraud with
particularity.51 Many fraud cases arise when the attorney
actively tries to hide negligent actions that occurred during repre-
sentation52 or mismanages client funds.5 3 Section 84-13 of the
North Carolina General Statutes54 allows plaintiffs to recover
double damages for attorney fraud.55 Plaintiffs may also impose
constructive trusts.
56
D. Constructive Fraud (or Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
In Miller v. Bank , the North Carolina Supreme Court
described constructive fraud as follows:
Constructive fraud differs from active fraud in that the intent to
deceive is not an essential element, but it is nevertheless fraud
though it rests upon presumption arising from breach of fiduciary
obligation rather than deception intentionally practiced.5 8
So it is the breach of a fiduciary duty alone that gives rise to a
rebuttable presumption of constructive fraud.59 The intent to
49. Bamberger v. Bernholz, 96 N.C. App. 555, 562, 386 S.E.2d 450, 454 (1989),
rev'd 326 N.C. 589, 391 S.E.2d 192 (1990)(citing Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 113,
63 S.E.2d 202, 205 (1951)).
50. See Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England, & Whitfield, 231 Cal. App. 3d 692, 282
Cal. Rptr. 627 (1991).
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 9 (b) (1993).
52. See Bamberger, 96 N.C. App 555, 386 S.E.2d 450, rev'd, 326 N.C. 589, 391
S.E.2d 192 (1990).
53. See McGee v. Eubanks, 77 N.C. App. 369, 335 S.E.2d 178 (1985).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-13 (1993).
55. Id.; See Booher v. Frue, 98 N.C. App. 570, 394 S.E.2d 816 (1990).
56. See Booher, 98 N.C. App. 570, 394 S.E.2d 816 (1990).
57. 234 N.C. 309, 316, 67 S.E.2d 362, 367 (1951); See also Vail v. Vail, 233
N.C. 109, 114, 63 S.E.2d 202, 206 (1951). There the court described constructive
fraud as follows:
Where a relation of trust and confidence exists between the parties,
'there is a duty to disclose all material facts, and failure to do so
constitutes fraud.' citing 37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 16, p. 247. Id.
58. Miller, 234 N.C. at 316, 67 S.E.2d at 367.
59. Id.; See also Carroll v. Rountree, 36 N.C. App. 156, 243 S.E.2d 821 (1978).
128 [Vol. 18:121
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deceive the client is not necessary and usually is not taken into
account.60 Cases suggest that constructive fraud often occurs
where the attorney fails to disclose information, acts against his
clients financial interests in favor of himself, or rides the coattails
of a client's recovery for his own gain.6 ' As in actual fraud, double
damages and constructive trusts are available.62 Usually, claims
of fraud and constructive fraud are pled together because the
same facts easily give rise to both; the result of which is even if the
defendant wins the fraud claim, he can still be found liable for
constructive fraud.63
Some states have extended an attorney's fiduciary duties to
include the shareholders of corporate clients.64 North Carolina
has not yet done so.
E. Statutory Duties
Numerous statutes impose duties upon attorneys. Violating
these duties can give rise to civil liability. Federal statutes, such
as the Securities Exchange Act of 193465 and the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations'Act of 1970 (RICO),66 provide
dangers for attorneys nationally. Firms that handle securities
transactions may face § 10 (b)67 violations, but Rule 10b-5 61 viola-
60. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 39, § 8.9.
61. See Booher v. Frue, 98 N.C. App. 570, 394 S.E.2d 816 (1990); Bamberger
v. Bernholz, 96 N.C. App. 555, 386 S.E.2d 450 (1989), rev'd, 326 N.C. 589, 391
S.E.2d 192 (1990); Carroll, 36 N.C. App. 156, 243 S.E.2d 821.
62. See Booher, 98 N.C. App. 570, 394 S.E.2d 816.
63. Id.; See also Webster v. Powell, 98 N.C. App. 432, 391 S.E.2d 204 (1990);
Bamberger, 96 N.C. App. 555, 386 S.E.2d 450 (1989), rev'd, 326 N.C. 589, 391
S.E.2d 192 (1990); McGee v. Eubanks, 77 N.C. App. 369, 335 S.E.2d 178 (1985);
Carroll, 36 N.C. App. 156, 243 S.E.2d 821.
64. See Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C.,
405 Mass. 506, 541 N.E.2d 997 (1989).
65. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 j (b) (West 1981).
66. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995). See also,
MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 39, § 9.11, n. 2 (citing American Bar Association,
Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force (1985)). The report notes that 97%
of RICO suit against attorneys involve § 1962 (c) violations. Id.
67. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (b) (West 1981). This is better known as section 10 (b).
In part, it reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,. . .(b)To use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
1996] 129
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tions are much more common. Also, attorneys are often exposed
to RICO violations under § 1962 (c). 69
North Carolina has it own securities act which attorneys deal-
ing in securities should beware. 70 The state also has the North
Carolina Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act.
71
Judicial sanctions under both federal7 2 and state7 3 law should also
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors. Id.
This is a huge area of civil liability, and many books deal only with securities
regulation. See generally Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION (1988); MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 39, § 10.
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989). Providing in part:
It shall unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Id.
69. See supra note 66.
70. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A (1993).
71. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-2 (1990). This act is similar to the federal
RICO act.
72. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The rule states:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the
attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A Party who
is not represented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion,
or other paper and state the party's address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses
or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
10
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be remembered. This list is by no means exhaustive, but attor-
neys should be aware that statutes remain a source of potential
liability.
F. Agency
Agency concepts affect an attorney's partners and his clients.
Under North Carolina's partnership law, partners are agents of
the partnership. 74 An attorney may bind the partnership entity
when he commits malpractice.7 5 His partners may also be held
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fees. Id.
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 11(a) (1993). The rule states in part:
(a) Signing by an attorney. Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or
other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or
movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of
this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee. Id.
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-39 (1993).
75. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-43 (1993), which states:
Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the
ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority
of his copartners, loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a
partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership
is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting
to act. Id.
See also Dwiggins v. Parkway Bus Co., 230 N.C. 234, 52 S.E.2d 892
(1949)(plaintiff injured by one partner's tort in the course of partnership
business, where plaintiff sued that partner individually, has a judgment on that
plaintiff individually and on the partnership property, not the other partners
1996]
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jointly and severally liable.76 So malpractice by a partner may
bind the firm and other partners, 77 unless the partner committing
the malpractice was sued individually.78 Then only that partner
and the partnership entity are liable. 79 But if the malpractice is
outside the ordinary course of the partnership business, only the
tortfeasor-partner is liable." It is this joint and several liability
that makes the partnership a risky venture. Attorneys have
searched for years for sanctuary from that risk.
Further, an attorney may be liable as an agent of the client to
the client or a third party, leading to a malpractice recovery.81 , As
an agent, the attorney may enter into any dealing that he has the
individually); Shelton v. Fairley, 86 N.C. App. 147, 356 S.E.2d 917 (1987)(stating
that this section applies to law partnerships).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45 (a) (1993). It states in part:
(a) all partners are jointly and severally liable for the acts and
obligations of the partnership. Id.
See Johnson v. Gill, 235 N.C. 40, 68 S.E.2d 788 (1952); Dwiggins, 230 N.C. 234,
52 S.E.2d 892. Both cases noted that each partner is jointly and severally liable
for a tort committed by a partner in the course of partnership business, and that
the injured party has the choice to sue all the partners or any one partner. Id.
77. See supra notes 75-76.
78. See Dwiggins, 230 N.C. 234, 52 S.E.2d 892. If the injured party sues the
tortfeasor-partner individually, he may only recover against that partner
personally and the partnership property. But the plaintiff may elect to sue one
or all of the partners. The plaintiff has to two choices: sue either the tortfeasor
and the partnership entity or sue the partners personally.
79. Id.
80. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-43 and 59-45 (1993); Dwiggins, 230 N.C. 234,
52 S.E.2d 892 (Each partner is jointly and severally liable for a tort committed in
the ordinary course of the partnership business); Jackson v. Jackson, 20 N.C.
App. 406, 201 S.E.2d 722 (1974)(Malicious prosecution is not within the ordinary
course of business of a law partnership). The key here is whether the tort was
committed while doing something that a partnership normally does in the
practice of law.
81. State v. Barley, 240 N.C. 253, 81 S.E.2d 772 (1954)(attorney/client
relation is one of agency); See Forbes Homes, Inc. v. Trimpi, 318 N.C. 473, 349
S.E.2d 852 (1986); Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, PA., 286 N.C. 24, 209 S.E.2d
795 (1974). These cases show the various ways attorneys operate as agents for
clients. An agent's authority to bind the principal is express, implied, or
apparent. Third parties often have to determine whether the agent is acting for
a principal or for himself. This leads to undisclosed and disclosed principal
concepts. Id. See generally 24 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA- INDEX 4TH Principal
and Agent §§ 1-53 (1993). See also Howell v. Smith, 261 N.C. 256, 134 S.E.2d
381 (1964); Walston v. R.B. Whitley & Co., Inc., 226 N.C. 537, 39 S.E.2d 375
(1946); Walker v. Pacific Mobile Homes, Inc., 413 P.2d 3 (Wash. 1966); Zummach
v. Polasek, 32 N.W. 33 (Wis. 1929).
132 [Vol. 18:121
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authority to enter.8 2  Through express, implied, or apparent
authority, the agent may bind the client as principal.8 3 An agent
is personally liable for any deals made outside the agent's author-
ity, absent estoppel or ratification. 4 This situation often arises
when attorneys have to make quick decisions in sales, negotia-
tions, settlements, contracts, and other transactions for clients.8 "
Also, agency and respondeat superior imputes the staff members'
negligence to the firm.8 6
G. Defenses
Historically, attorneys have had numerous defenses available
in malpractice actions including an invalid underlying claim, 7
contributory negligence,8 8 estoppel, 89 ratification,90 accord and
satisfaction,91 scrivener,92 in pari delicto ,9 lack of an attorney-
client relation,94 and the statute of limitations.9 5 What defense is
necessary depends largely on the type of claim involved.
82. See generally cases cited supra note 81.
83. See generally cases cited supra note 81.
84. See generally cases cited supra note 81.
85. See generally cases cited supra note 81. The actions by third parties here
are usually under agency principles and not under malpractice. However, clients
will often bring ialpractice actions based on tort, contract, or breach of a
fiduciary duty where the attorney has bound the client against the client's
wishes.
86. See generally 24 STRONG's NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 4TH §§ 1-53 (1993);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219, 229 (1957); MALLEN & SMITH, supra
note 39, § 5.5; See also Lane v. Williams, 521 A.2d 706 (Me. 1987); Stinson v.
Brand, 738 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. 1987). Typical actions here are based on
administrative mistakes such as misplacing files and calendaring errors. But
staff breaches of fiduciary duties (for example, breaches of confidentiality) may
also carry to the attorney. Id.
87. See Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355 (1985); Bamberger v.
Bernholz, 96 N.C. App. 555, 386 S.E.2d 450 (1989), rev'd, 326 N.C. 589, 391
S.E.2d 192 (1990).
88. See In re Allan & Warmbold, 322 N.C. 480, 370 S.E.2d 222 (1988).
89. See Lowry v. Lowry, 99 N.C. App. 246, 393 S.E.2d 141 (1990).
90. Id. See Hill v. Hill, 94 N.C. App. 474, 380 S.E.2d 540 (1989); Stewart v.
Herring, 80 N.C. App. 529, 342 S.E.2d 566 (1986).
91. See Summer v. Allran, 100 N.C. App. 182, 394 S.E.2d 689 (1990).
92. See Lawson v. Lawson, 84 N.C. App. 51, 351 S.E.2d 794 (1987), rev'd on
other grounds, 321 N.C. 274 (1987). The defendant-attorney argued that all he
did was draft documents and that there was no representation beyond that.
93. See Merrell v. Stewart, 220 N.C. 326, 17 S.E.2d 458 (1941).
94. See Broyhill v. Aycock & Spence, 102 N.C. App. 382, 402 S.E.2d 167
(1991)(verbal or written agreement or payment of fees not necessary for attorney
client relation, it can be implied through actions of parties); Booher v. Frue, 98
1996] 133
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But now, the nature of this creature is changing. He is
becoming more intelligent, more devious, and much stronger.
III. STRENGTHENING THE LiMBs: 9 6 Rule Evidence & New
Claims
Several developments have energized the creature's limbs,
strengthening his grip and quickening his stride. The Rules of
Professional Conduct redefine the -legal standard of care, thus
increasing the chance of liability and creating a uniform duty of
care. Attorneys may contract themselves into providing what
courts consider a "continuing course of treatment." Finally, the
tort for negligent infliction of emotional distress considerably
raises the economic risks of legal practice.
N.C. App. 570, 394 S.E.2d 816 (1990)(attorney argued no relation with client
when his only action is referral; attorney lost); Insurance Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C.
App. 284, 244 S.E.2d 177 (1978)(non-client must allege non-privity). This
defense involves attacking the third party claimant as well as the client. In
essence, the defendant-attorney is saying that there was no attorney-client
relation, so no duty was owed. This is not a very successful defense.
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-15(c) and 1-52 (1993). § 1-15(c) is the malpractice
accrual statute:
Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action for
malpractice arising out of the performance of or failure to perform
professional services shall be deemed to accrue at the time of the
occurrence of the last act of the Defendant giving rise to the cause of
action: Provided that whenever there is bodily injury to the person,
economic or monetary loss, or a defect or damage to property which
originates under circumstances making the injury, loss, defect or
damage not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin,
and the injury, loss, defect or damage is discovered or should reasonably
be discovered by the claimant two or more years after the occurrence of
the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action, suit must
be commenced within one year from the date discovery is made:
Provided nothing herein shall be construed to reduce the statute of
limitation in any such case below three years. Provided further, that in
no event shall an action be commenced more than four years from the
last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.. Id.
96. See SHELLEY, supra note 1.
I suddenly beheld the figure of a man, at some distance, advancing
towards me with superhuman speed. He bounded over the crevices in
the ice, among which I had walked with caution... I perceived, as the
shape came nearer (sight tremendous and abhorred!) that it was the
wretch whom I had created. . .'Devil,' I exclaimed ..... said the
daemon.. .'Yet you, my creator, detest and spurn me, thy creature, to
whom thou art bound by ties only dissoluble by the annihilation of one of
us.'" Id. at 83-84.
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A. The Massive Arms of the Rules of Professional Conduct
In North Carolina, the Rules of Professional Conduct do not
define the standards for civil liability per se.97 Under the old Code
of Professional Responsibility, s" the courts routinely held that a
breach of a rule did not lead to liability per se and refused to admit
rules into evidence at malpractice trials.9 9 In 1985, the State Bar
adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct.100 The Scope of the
North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct states in part:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor
should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been
breached. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers
and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through discipli-
nary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil
liability.101
97. See Booher v. Frue, 98 N.C. App. 570, 394 S.E.2d 816 (1990); THE
ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
BAR, Scope (1993). Malpractice actions and ethical grievances are not the same
thing, although the same set of facts may give rise to both. Malpractice actions
are filed in court and serve to compensate an injured party. They are filed by an
injured client or related party. Ethical grievances are filed with the State Bar.
Anyone can file an ethical grievance when they feel an attorney has acted
improperly. "Anyone" includes clients, judges, other attorneys, and any member
of the general public. Ethical grievances result in possible disciplinary action of
the attorney, and no monetary award is involved.
98. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
STATE BAR, Preliminary Statement (1980). In relevant part:
[Tihe code makes no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures
or penalties for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to
define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct.
Id.
99. Webster v. Powell, 98 N.C. App. 432, 391 S.E.2d 204 (1990)(motion in
limine granted to prevent rules from being introduced into evidence); McGee v.
Eubanks, 77 N.C. App. 369, 335 S.E.2d 178 (1985).
100. The North Carolina State Bar adopted the Code of Professional
Responsibility on January 12, 1973, and the North Carolina Supreme Court
approved the Code for use on April 30, 1973. The Code became effective on
January 1, 1974. The Bar adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct on July 26,
1985. The Supreme Court approved them for use on October 7, 1985.
101. THE ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA STATE BAR, Scope (1993). See, MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 39, § 15.7.
The authors say that the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates a more
mandatory set of rules, than does the Rules of Professional Conduct, which tend
to be aspirational. Id.
1996]
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Despite this authority, courts are beginning use the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct in malpractice trials as evidence of the attor-
ney's duty.
1. The Case
In Booher v. Frue,'10 2 a North Carolina attorney referred- his
client to another attorney in Texas for the purpose of bringing var-
ious actions in Texas. 10 3 The two attorneys made a referral fee
arrangement without the clients knowledge. 10 4 The Texas attor-
ney was to get one-third of each of two recoveries and one-fourth of
another as contingency fees, while the North Carolina attorney
would get one-third of the total contingency fees as a referral
fee.105 Subsequently, the client sued the North Carolina attorney
under a constructive fraud theory.. 10 6
102. 98 N.C. App. 570, 394 S.E.2d 816 (1990).
103. Booher, 98 N.C. App. at 574, 394 S.E.2d at 817.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 575, 394 S.E.2d at 817.
106. Id. at 574, 394 S.E.2d at 818.
107. DR2-106 provides in part:
Fees for Legal Services.
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an
illegal or clearly excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer
of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction
that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as
guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Id.
See THE ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
STATE BAR Rule 2.6 (A)-(B) (1993). DR2-106 (A) and (B) are exactly the same as
Rule 2.6 (A) and (B). Id.
108. DR2-107 (A) provides:
Division of Fees Among Lawyers.
136 [Vol. 18:121
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At trial, the court allowed DR2-106' 0 and DR2-107108 of the
old North Carolina Code of Professional Responsibility' 0 9into evi-
dence as part of the attorney's duty to the client.1 10 The discipli-
nary rules showed that the Rules of Professional Conduct forbid
lawyers of different firms from splitting fees without the client's
consent or knowledge."1 On appeal, the court held that violation
of a Rule was not liability per se, but the Rules were admissible as
evidence of the attorney's duty to the client." 2
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer
who is not a partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full
disclosure that a division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and
responsibility assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable
compensation for all legal services they rendered the client. Id.
See THE ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
STATE BAR Rule 2.6 (D) (1993):
(D) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may
be made only if-
(1) The division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes
joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) The client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all
the lawyers involved; and
(3) The total fee is reasonable. Id.
The two rules are practically identical. The referral fee arrangement clearly
amounted to fee splitting under DR2-106 and DR2-107. The defendant-attorney
provided no legal services but collected a fee any way, without the client's
consent because there was no disclosure. See supra note 107.
109. See THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
STATE BAR (1980).
110. Booher, 98 N.C. App. 570, 581, 394 S.E.2d 816, 821 (1990).
111. See supra notes 107-08.
112. Booher, 98 N.C. App. at 581, 394 S.E.2d at 821-22. Another strange twist
emerged from this case. The defendant-attorney argued that the North Carolina
rules should not apply since the referral arrangement was made in Texas, where
the ethics rules allowed such arrangements. The court rejected the argument
finding that the attorney-client relation was born in North Carolina, and the
defendant was a North Carolina attorney, so the North Carolina rules applied,
not the Texas rules. This almost creates a conflict of laws for ethical standards.
Id.
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2. The Analysis
The admission of Rules of Professional Conduct1 13 into evi-
dence increases the plaintiff's chance of recovery by redefining the
attorney's duties. In fraud and constructive fraud cases, the speci-
ficity of the Rules 1 4 alters the requisite elements of the actions.
In negligence cases, the Rules 15 subvert the standard of care by
asking the wrong questions.
3. Presumed Intent & Liability Per Se
In fraud actions, the key element is the intent to deceive.
116
The plaintiff must show that element by a preponderance of the
evidence. The Rules11 7 help the plaintiff to redefine fraud by cre-
ating a presumption of intent. How is this presumption created?
Through clarity and simplicity. The clearer the submitted rule,
the more likely a breach of it will be found. The more rules the
plaintiff can get into court,the more likely it is that he will sway
the jury. For example, see Rule 5.8, stating as follows:
A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the
lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by
law and the client is independently represented in making the
agreement, or settle a disputed claim for such liability with an
unrepresented client or former client without first advising that
person in writing that independent representation may appropri-
ate in connection therewith.118
Rule 5.8,119 like most of the Rules, 12 is very specific in its terms.
It clearly tells an attorney what to do, and what not to do. If an
113. See THE ANNOTATED RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA STATE BAR (1993).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 63 S.E.2d 202 (1951).
117. See supra note 113.
118. THE ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA STATE BAR Rule 5.8 (1993).
119. Id.
120. See supra note 113. See Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash.2d 251, 830 P.2d
646 (1992). The Washington Supreme Court refused to admit the rules in
evidence because they are considered minimum standards of attorney behavior.
That is why the rules are so clear and simplistic. An injured party can only seek
a non-financial disciplinary action from the state for a rule violation, absent any
damage. Not every rule breach causes damage that would be compensable in a
civil case. The Court expressed concern that the using the rules in a malpractice
case dragged the level of civil culpability down due to their simplicity, noting the
legal standard of care is a higher standard of care because of the damage
[Vol. 18:121138
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attorney settles a malpractice claim with an unrepresented client,
and Rule 5.8121 is then used in the resulting fraud case, the battle
will revolve around intent.
The clarity of Rule 5.8122 guarantees that any conduct to the
contrary, no matter how menial, will be a blatant breach. If sev-
eral Rules 23 are introduced, evidence can mount rapidly showing
multiple breaches of clearly defined Rules. 124 Rules which are evi-
dence of the attorney's duty to his client.1 25 The plaintiff's ques-
tion to the jury becomes,"The Rules 126 are so clear, how could an
attorney not understand or not follow them?" That question and
the Rules127 themselves raise the presumption of intent, and the
simpler the rule, the more apparent a breach becomes.
The strength of the presumption is measured by the clarity
and simplicity of the Rule. The clearer the Rule, the more obvious
the breach, thus the stronger the presumption. Intent becomes
defined by the clarity of the Rule in relation to the conduct. The
attorney is quickly overwhelmed by a presumption. Before Rule-
evidence, the plaintiff would have to show evidence of intent some
other way, no matter how egregious the attorney's conduct. Even
worse, in constructive fraud (i.e., breach of fiduciary duty) cases,
Rule-evidence can create liability per se. Recall the following
definition:
Constructive fraud differs from active fraud in that the intent to
deceive is not an essential element, but it is nevertheless fraud
though it rests upon presumption arising from breach of fiduciary
obligation rather than deception intentionally practiced.'
21
required to sue upon. Id. See, MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 39, § 1.6. This is the
exact concern here. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 118.
122. See supra note 118.
123. See supra note 113.
124. See supra note 113. See Booher, 98 N.C. App. 570, 581, 394 S.E.2d 816,
821. This is exactly what happened to the defendant attorney there. DR2-106
and DR2-107 plainly showed that the defendant had not complied with ethical
obligations. See supra note 120.
125. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 113-20.
127. See supra notes 113-20.
128. Miller v. Bank, 234 N.C. 309, 316, 67 S.E.2d 362, 367 (1951); See Vail v.
Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 114, 63 S.E.2d 202, 206 (1951).
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Here, no intent showing is required.129 The plaintiff need only
show the breach of a fiduciary duty owed to him. 30 A lesser show-
ing is required than in fraud. The greater the Rule-clarity, the
easier it is to find a breach. A jury reading the definition of con-
structive fraud and then looking at clear, fiduciary-type rules, like
Rule 5.8,131 could easily conclude that there had been some fiduci-
ary duty owed, and that there was in fact a breach of this duty and
thus liability. 132 This becomes even more likely when multiple
Rules are put into evidence. There can be more breaches for the
jury to consider. For all intents and purposes; constructive fraud
becomes a liability per se action. The ethical standard begins to
alter the elements of an action by being considered the attorney's
legal duty in court.
4. Blurring the Legal Standard of Care
In cases of alleged transactional or implied contractual negli-
gence, the Rules 33 confuse the proper standard of care by asking
the wrong, irrelevant question. This makes liability more likely.
The court, in malpractice cases, looks to the
Hodges 13 4standard of care: 1 35
Ordinarily when an attorney engages in the practice of the law
and contracts to prosecute an action in behalf of his client, he
impliedly represents that (1) he possesses the requisite degree of
learning, skill, and ability necessary to the practice of his profes-
sion and which others similarly situated ordinarily possess; (2) he
will exert his best judgment in the prosecution of the litigation
129. Miller, 234 N.C. at 316, 67 S.E.2d at 367.
130. Id.
131. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Allowing Rules as evidence in
fraud/constructive fraud cases works against the defendant another way. Even if
he wins the fraud claim, he will still face a constructive fraud claim that he is
almost certain to lose. Id.; See also North Carolina State Bar v. Sheffield, 73
N.C. App. 349, 326 S.E.2d 320 (1985)(Standard of proof in Bar disciplinary
proceeding is clear, convincing, and cogent evidence). There is also a standard of
proof problem when Rules are used in court. The standard of proof in civil
actions is preponderance of the evidence. So in court, Rule breaches are being
found at a lower evidentiary standard. See supra note 120.
133. See supra notes 113 and 120.
134. 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954)
135. See supra notes 33 and 45 and accompanying text; See also supra note 27
and accompanying text. Litigatory negligence cases are not affected to any great
extent by the clouding of the standard of care because the plaintiff would still
have to pass the "trial within a trial" test.
140 [Vol. 18:121
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entrusted to him; and (3) he will exercise reasonable and ordinary
care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of
his knowledge to his client's cause.136
Compare Rule 6 to the above quotation: Rule 6 Failing to Act
Competently
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that
he is not competent to handle, without associating himself with
a lawyer who is competent to handle it. Competent representa-
tion requires legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and prepara-
tion reasonably necessary for the representation.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate under
the circumstances.
(B) A lawyer shall:
(1) Keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.
(2) Explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to per-
mit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.
(3) Act with reasonable diligence and promptness in represent-
ing the client.13
7
Under the Hodges standard, 8' the practices of other "similarly
situated"139 attorneys and the defendant are compared to deter-
mine liability. 140 But under Rule 6,11 the defendants conduct is
judged on its own face. The Rules 142 ask the wrong question. The
proper question is "What do other attorneys in the same practice
and geographic area do, and did the defendant conform to that?"
136. Hodges, 239 N.C. at 519, 80 S.E.2d at 145-46.
137. THE ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA STATE BAR Rule 6 (1993):
138. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
139. See Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355 (1985); Hodges, 239
N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144. "Similarly situated" means other attorneys in the same
geographical area engaged in the same area of law. For example Rorrer looked'
at the attorneys in Greensboro handling medical malpractice cases. Hodges
looked at the state as a whole.
140. See Rorrer, 313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355 (the plaintiff has an evidentiary
burden of showing the practices of other attorneys, and that the defendant did
not observe those practices); Hodges, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (attorney not
liable for following legally invalid service procedure because all North Carolina
attorneys had done the same thing for 20 years, and the law on it was unclear).
141. See supra note 137. Notice the title of Rule 6-Failing -to Act
Competently." Just the title makes it look like a legal duty of care.
142. See supra note 113.
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Not,"What did the defendant do, and did it conform to the ethical
Rules?"14 3 Thus, the rule-evidence14 4 shifts the relevant focus.
Shifting the focus isolates the defendant-attorney. This is
important because even if the defendant-attorney's conduct was in
line with other attorneys' practices, the plaintiff can use the Rules
to make the defendant-attorney's conduct appear worse than that
of the other attorneys. 145 Before Rule-evidence, a plaintiff could
not enjoy this easy isolation. How much can the water be mud-
died? It becomes a mere game of perception.
Remember, comparing the attorney's conduct against a sub-
mitted Rule increases the chance of finding a breach of the Rule.
The greater the simplicity and clarity of the Rule, the more obvi-
ous the breach. The defendant-attorney can be made to appear
incompetent despite the practices of other attorneys. 146 This
alone does not create liability, but it does help the plaintiff to
cloud the real issue and create the impression of a breach of duty.
When you ask the wrong question, you get the wrong answer.
And flowing from this is the creation of a uniform legal stan-
dard of care for attorneys in North Carolina. 147 The legal require-
ment of showing what other attorneys in the same practice and
geographic area do becomes a nullity, since the plaintiff can argue
that all attorneys are bound by the Rules. 14 The legal and ethical
standard of attorney conduct merges into one. This merger fur-
ther increases the likelihood of attorney liability because rule-evi-
dence usurps the notion that the Rules themselves are not
standards of civil liability, and more critically that the level of con-
143. See supra notes 113 and 120.
144. See supra notes 113 and 120.
145. See supra notes 113 and 120.
146. This puts the defendant at a disadvantage because if he has not fully
conformed with a Rule, and it is common practice not to, he must then find
attorneys who are willing to admit that in court as an expert witness. See supra
note 120.
147. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text. The conflict between a
statewide and local legal standard of care is reflected in Hodges and Rorrer. The
question has never been decided as a matter of law in North Carolina. Other
states however have addressed the issue. See Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash.2d
251, 830 P.2d 646 (1992)(noting that Washington uses a statewide standard of
liability).
148. See THE ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA STATE BAR (1993). See supra note 120.
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duct required to breach most ethical rules is not enough on its own
to violate the Hodges legal standard of care.149
That is because the Rules are often considered a minimum
standard of behavior of which the attorney is liable only to the
state for violations. 150  Indeed, this expectation of a minimum
level of behavior is why the Rules are so clear and simple in the
first place. Not every breach of rule will injure a client, and every
breach that does injure a client may not be of a serious enough
nature to lead to civil liability under the Hodges standard. 15 1 But
the rule-evidence/legal standard merger puts an unreasonable
burden on the defendant-attorneys by requiring them to show that
they were not only within ethical standards but that they were
also within legal standards. But if they were not within ethical
standards, they would have to show that the ethical violation was
in no way causally related to the legal standard, and that the ethi-
cal violation did not cause damage that would violate legal stan-
dards. It is the later scenario that becomes nearly impossible to
show since the line between the two standards are blurred. So as
North Carolina courts continue to admit rule-evidence, the crea-
ture's arms will grow stronger, stretching outward to snap more
and more attorneys in their crushing grip.
B. Increasing His Stamina: Longer Liability Over Time
North Carolina medical malpractice law has long recognized
the concept of a doctor's liability in a "continuous course of treat-
149. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text. See supra note 101 and
accompanying text. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 830 P.2d 646. The preceding
provides an extensive discussion of the intent behind ethical standards as
minimum standards of attorney conduct. A breach of which provides only a
public remedy, i.e. bar discipline, and not a private cause of action. See also
Mayol v. Summers, Watson, & Kimpel, 223 Ill. App. 3d 794, 585 N.E.2d 1176,
166 Ill. Dec. 154 (1992)(ethical rules are minimum standards of behavior).
Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991)(Maryland's version of the
Rules of Professional Conduct are inadmissible in legal malpractice cases as they
do not constitute standards of civil liability). See also MALLEN & SMITH, supra
note 39, § 6.27. See also supra note 120.
150. Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 830 P.2d 646. The Hizey court notes that the
Code and the Rules are too confusing to try to apply in a malpractice case
because they are minimum standards of conduct. The inherent incongruity
between the ethical rules and legal standards of care only serve to distort the
true issues. Id.
151. Id.
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ment."'52 This theory holds that the statute of limitations on a
medical malpractice action tolls until the last act of treatment
occurs, and upon the last act involved in the treatment the statute
begins to run.153 In effect, the action survives longer than it would
if measured from the actual injury. This concept has energized
the creature, increasing his vigor. He now runs even farther.
1. The Case
In Hargett v. Holland,5 4 the plaintiffs were children of a tes-
tator whose will had been drafted by the defendant-attorney. 55
The drafting and execution took place in 1978.156 The will lan-
guage was unclear as to whether the plaintiffs or the testator's
second wife were to receive the remainder of a life estate in the
family farm.1 5 7 The wife and children litigated the matter, the
plaintiff-children receiving the remainder.15 8 The children subse-
quently sued the defendant-attorney in 1991, claiming he negli-
gently drafted the will.' 5 9
The trial court ruled that the plaintiff's action was barred by
the applicable statute of limitations and granted the defendant's
Rule 12 (b)(6) motion to dismiss.' 60  However, the Court of
Appeals, in a widely criticized decision, reversed.' 6 ' They held
that the last act giving rise to the cause of action was not the exe-
cution of the will but was instead the testator's death in 1988.162
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals, holding that the testator and attorney had only con-
tracted to draft and execute a will.' 63 By the implied terms of the
contract, once the execution was complete, the relationship was
152. Mathis v. May, 86 N.C. App. 436, 358 S.E.2d 94 (1987); Ballenger v.
Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 247 S.E.2d 287 (1978).
153. Ballenger, 38 N.C. App. at 58, 247 S.E.2d at 290. See supra note 95 and
accompanying text. This is the appropriate statute of limitations for legal and
medical malpractice actions.
154. 337 N.C. 651, 447 S.E.2d 784 (1994).
155. Id. at 654, 447 S.E.2d at 787.
156. Id. at 653, 447 S.E.2d at 787.
157. Id. at 653-54, 447 S.E.2d at 787.
158. Id. at 654, 447 S.E.2d at 787.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Hargett v. Holland, 111 N.C. App. 200, 431 S.E.2d 784 (1993), rev'd, 337
N.C. 651, 447 S.E.2d 784 (1994).
162. Id. at 203-04, 431 S.E.2d at 786.
163. See Hargett, 337 N.C. 651 at 655-57, 447 S.E.2d at 788.
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over and the statute began to run. 1 6 4 Attorneys from around the
state huffed a great sigh of relief.
2. The Analysis
While many attorneys feel that the short term effect of this
case has been to level mountains of potential liability, the long
term impact of the case has been largely ignored. Chief Justice
Exum's decision was by no means a wide-swiping brush that pro-
tects every attorney who drafts wills. It is more correctly read as
an extremely narrow opinion that protects attorneys only where
they have been wise enough to clearly delineate where their ser-
vice begins and ends. More ominously, Chief Justice Exum
extended the circumstances and time period whereby an attorney
may be held liable for malpractice.
In Hargett, Chief Justice Exum delved into the depths of the
"continuous course of treatment" doctrine. 165 He analogized this
concept to the liability that the Court of Appeals had imposed on
the defendant-attorney. 166 This discussion went well beyond mere
dicta. The current state of the law in North Carolina, according to
the Exum decision, is that to invoke the "continuous course of
treatment" doctrine in the legal malpractice context, a plaintiff
must allege an "ongoing attorney-client relationship," or in the
least "allegations of facts from which such a relationship may be
inferred."'67
The key to properly pleading the "continuing course of treat-
ment" doctrine in the legal malpractice context is determining the
following: 1. what service was contracted for (i.e., was it
164. Id.
165. Id. See Mathis v. May, 86 N.C. App. 436, 358 S.E.2d 94, disc. rev. denied,
320 N.C. 794, 361 S.E.2d 78 (1987); Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 247
S.E.2d 287 (1978). These are the leading North Carolina cases on the continuous
course of treatment doctrine in the medical malpractice area. The rule is best
stated as where doctor continues a particular course of treatment over a period of
time and there is some negligence in the treatment, the statute of limitations
begins to run on the last act of the treatment. North Carolina also states the
theory as once negligence has occurred:
so long as the relationship of surgeon and patient continued, the
surgeon was guilty of malpractice during that entire relationship for not
repairing the damage he had done and, therefore, the cause of action
arose against him arose at the conclusion of his contractual relationship.
Ballenger, 38 N.C. App. at 58, 247 S.E.2d at 293(citing DeLong v. Campbell, 157
Ohio St. 22, 25, 47 Ohio Ops. 27, 104 N.E.2d 177, 178 (1952)).
166. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 655-57, 447 S.E.2d at 788.
167. Id. at 655-56, 447 S.E.2d at 788.
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expressly or impliedly continuous or non-continuous), 2. whether
there was a breach of duty, and 3. when the last act of the service
contracted for occurred. 16  The service contracted for will deter-
mine the existence or non-existence of the "continuous course of
treatment."169 The date of the last act is the date used to measure
the starting point for the statute of limitations, as opposed to the
date the action actually accrued; as the tort committed here is in
the nature of a continuous tort that builds upon itself until
completed. 170
It is the nature of the service contracted (expressly or
impliedly) that controls the application of the doctrine.' 7' The
case makes clear that a continuous service would be one of the
type where the attorney would provide various services in a sin-
gle, stated endeavor over time. 72 The doctrine would apply there.
Conversely, a non-continuous service would end at a specified
time or event effectually severing the attorney-client
relationship. 173
What types of services could be considered continuous? Any
type of ongoing planning process, such as estate, tax, or business
planning could be seen as a continuous transaction. Some types of
litigation could be seen this way as well. A prime example is in
the family law arena, where claims for divorce, alimony, child sup-
port, and equitable distribution are so closely related that a mis-
take in one area has serious consequences in another area.
But there would seem to be a bright spot. It would appear
from Justice Exum's decision that attorneys can avoid the "contin-
uous course of treatment" doctrine through careful planning.'74
By using terms that clearly describe events in time as starting
and stopping points, a clear time line of the attorney-client rela-
tion can be created.1 75 This simplifies figuring out when the per-
formance of services contracted for began and ended. So if a fee/
representation agreement uses open-ended language in describing
the services and when they are to begin and end, that language
would seem to lend itself more readily to the doctrine.
168. Id. at 655-57, 447 S.E.2d at 788. See supra note 165.
169. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 655-57, 447 S.E.2d at 788. See supra note 165.
170. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 655-57, 447 S.E.2d at 788.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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The "continuous course of treatment" theory affects both neg-
ligence and contract actions. 176 But as stated above, the service
sought will determine the extent of liability in those theories.
Transactional negligence seems to be the biggest expansion area
as litigatory negligence will be subject to the "trial within a trial"
test and harder to show over time. 177
The creature now has increased stamina. He is free to race
over miles and miles of countryside, into the cold, damp night.
C. Quickening the Gate: Adding a New Claim
Parties injured by legal malpractice have traditionally recov-
ered in the same way as under the North Carolina tort law. 178 In
the past, claims for emotional distress in legal malpractice cases
were rarely allowed because of their speculative nature. 179 But
this is no longer the situation. The creature not only runs further,
but he now runs faster.
1. The Case
In Johnson v. Ruark,180 a medical malpractice case, a group of
doctors allowed a mother to give birth to a fetus they knew to be
stillborn.1 8 ' The parents sued, with one of the claims being for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress.' 8 2 The trial court dis-
missed the claims on a Rule 12 (b) (6) motion, ruling that North
Carolina law required the plaintiff to suffer some physical injury
or damage from the defendant's act to collect for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress.' 8 3 The appellate court recognized
the claim and reversed, however.' 8 4 The Supreme Court affirmed
and validated claims for the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
176. See supra notes 19 and 23-32 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 19 and 23-32 and accompanying text.
178. See Patrick v. Ronald Williams P.A., 102 N.C. App. 355, 402 S.E.2d 452
(1991)(compensatory and punitive damages are available); Harris v. Maready, 84
N.C. App. 607, 353 S.E.2d 656 (1987)(damages must not be speculative); See also,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-13 (1993)(allowing double damages for attorney fraud);
Booher v. Frue, 98 N.C. App. 570, 394 S.E.2d 816 (1990)(allowing double
damages under N.C.G.S. § 84-13 for constructive fraud).
179. See Weaver v. Early, 325 N.C. 535, 385 S.E.2d 334 (1989); Carroll v.
Rountree, 34 N.C. App. 167, 237 S.E.2d 566 (1977).
180. 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
181. Id. at 287, 395 S.E.2d at 87.
182. Id.
183. Id.; See also Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
184. See Johnson, 327 N.C. at 287, 395 S.E.2d at 87.
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tress when caused by concern for another or where the plaintiff
suffered no physical harm.15
2. The Analysis
Under Johnson,18 6 the plaintiff is allowed recovery for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress out of concern for
another, or where there is no physical injury. He must show the
following: 1. the defendant was negligent; 2. it was reasonably
foreseeable that the conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emo-
tional distress; and 3. the conduct did cause severe emotional dis-
tress.'" 7 No physical harm from the defendant's act or physical
harm is required; only a generally recognized psychological condi-
tion must be shown.' 88 The foreseeability of harm is judged by the
plaintiff's proximity to the negligent act, the relationship between
the plaintiff and the other person for whose welfare the plaintiff is
concerned, and whether the plaintiff personally observed the neg-
ligent act.'8 9 The ultimate question is, does this claim apply to
legal malpractice? The answer is invariably yes.
In the past, the impediment which blocked plaintiffs from
recovering damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress
was the physical harm requirement. 190 Plaintiffs are never physi-
cally injured by an attorney's malpractice and would have trouble
showing any physical manifestation from emotional distress. 191
But now, that barrier is removed because the only injury required
is a recognized mental illness. 192
Also, the Johnson case was a professional malpractice case.
The North Carolina legislature and courts often lump medical
malpractice and legal malpractice together under the concept of
"professional malpractice.' 93 The legislature even gave both mal-
185. Id. at 306-07, 395 S.E.2d at 98-99.
186. 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
187. Id at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98. This issue of foreseeability matters only in
cases where emotional distress is brought on out of concern for another. It does
not apply to claims for the negligent infliction of emotional distress with a
physical injury. Id.
190. See Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960); Hinnant
v. Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
191. See supra note 190.
192. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
193. See supra note 95. See Hargett v. Holland, 337 N.C. 651, 447 S.E.2d 784
(1994). The court went into a lengthy discussion of the "continuous course of
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practice actions the same statute of limitations.194 Further, other
states recognize claims for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress in the legal malpractice context. 9 '
Most likely, this claim will have the biggest impact on trans-
actional negligence situations. Although application would not be
impossible in contract cases, the additional requirements needed
for a claim in such cases should limit the situations of applicabil-
ity.'96 Again, the Hodges standard of care 97 should be used in
actually determining negligence in transactions and implied con-
tract situations. It is easy to find scenarios where attorney negli-
gence causes emotional distress. If a will is defective, for example,
an entire estate could pass intestate, bypassing intended benefi-
ciaries. The harm here is clearly foreseeable and certain as is the
severe upset which surviving spouses and children would suffer.
The biggest battle may revolve around proving that a mental ill-
ness resulted from the negligence.1 98 This will probably result in
a battle of the experts.
treatment" doctrine that applies to medical malpractice cases. The court stated
that it could apply to the legal profession as well. Id.
194. N.C. GEN. STAT. §,1-15 (c) (1993).
195. See Tara Motors v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 576, 807 P.2d 418
(1991).
196. See Johnson, 327 N.C. at 301, 395 S.E.2d at 96 (citing Stanback v.
Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 194, 254 S.E.2d 611, 620 (1979))(normally, no recovery
in contract for emotional distress); Carroll v. Rountree, 34 N.C. App. 167, 237
S.E.2d 566 (1977)(no recovery for emotional distress due to negligent breach of
contract in legal malpractice case due to pecuniary nature of client's interest in
legal dealings). Because of these cases, claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress in implied contractual negligence cases will probably be
barred. Both courts cited the general rule that to recover for emotional distress
in contract, the plaintiff must show the following:
1. that the contract was not concerned with trade and commerce with
elements of profit involved; 2. contract had other benefits than
pecuniary (i.e., where pecuniary interests were not the dominating
motivating factor); and 3. contract must relate directly to matters of
dignity, mental concern, or solitude, or the sensibilities of the party to
whom the duty is owed which directly involves interests and emotions
recognized by all as involving great probability of resulting mental
anguish if not respected. Id.
See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. The Rorrer "trial within a trial"
test should protect the area of litigatory negligence.
197. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
198. See Johnson, 327 N.C. at 310, 395 S.E.2d at 100-01. In Justice Meyer's
dissent, he points out the difficulties in determining what mental disorders do in
fact accrue from emotional distress. Id.
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It seems unlikely that courts will allow claims based solely on
one's concern for another.19 9 While non-clients can recover for
transactional negligence, case law suggests that these parties had
more of an interest in the legal activity than mere observers. 20 0
The interest was usually financial.20 '
While no North Carolina legal malpractice cases have
reported claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress based
on the Johnson case, attorneys need to recognize that the legs of
the creature have gotten stronger and faster.
IV. FLEEING THE MONSTER 20
2
Is there respite from the continuous onslaught of the crea-
ture? Attorneys continue to search for sanctuary. Now, North
Carolina has two new business forms that offer some, but not
total, protection to the attorney and those he practices with.
A. New Business Forms
Two new business forms exist that offer attorneys somewhat
greater liability protection from malpractice committed by those
with whom they work: 1. Limited Liability Partnerships (LLP's)
and 2. Professional Limited Liability Companies (LLC's or
PLLC's). Their superiority to a partnership is evidenced in their
names. But because they are new, the judiciary has not examined
them yet, making analysis dependent upon statutory interpreta-
tion and prior law.
199. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. The foreseeability factors
should weed out the vast majority of claimants, especially if they are so far
removed as not to be involved or have an interest in the legal transaction.
200. See United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 263 S.E.2d 313
(1980)(non-client plaintiff relied on attorney's bad title search); Chicago Title Co.
v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 244 S.E.2d 177 (1978)(non-client title insurer sues
attorney after relying on bad lien waivers). See supra note 35 and accompanying
text. The balancing test for non-clients in transactional negligence cases seems
better suited for determining whether a non-client was harmed because it
expressly looks at the intent of the transaction itself.
201. See supra note 200.
202. See SHELLEY, supra note 1 and accompanying text. Frankenstein thought
he could hide from his creation. But the creature proved to be highly intelligent,
and he began to learn, amassing an intellect just as powerful as his body.
Eventually, he desired revenge on his creator, and he killed Frankenstein's loved
ones instead. An enraged Victor Frankenstein pursued his creature on a chase to
frozen ends of the Earth. At the end of which, Frankenstein died. Id.
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1. Limited Liability Partnerships
In 1993, the North Carolina General Assembly began to allow
partnerships to register with the Secretary of State as Limited
Liability Partnerships. 20 3 The advantages of doing so rest in the
concept of limited liability. A partner is only personally liable for
his own negligence or malfeasance, in the "ordinary course of the
partnership business," and not for another partner's, unless the
acting partner or employee was under the partner's "supervision
or direction," or the partner himself was "directly involved."
20 4
Clearly, the partner involved in the act will be personally liable
himself, as would the LLP entity.20 But it is clear that the nor-
mal joint and several liability among partners in ordinary part-
nerships is avoided.20 6 However, this does not mean that partners
in an LLP cannot be treated as a partnership in certain situations.
The creature is still lurking in the darkness.
203. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-84.2 (1993).
204. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45 (1993). Section 59-45 provides:
Nature of partner's liability in ordinary partnerships and in registered
limited liability partnerships
(a) Except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, all partners are
jointly and severally liable for the acts and obligations of the
partnership.
(b) A partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not
individually liable for debts and obligations of the partnership arising
from errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance
committed in the course of partnership business by another partner or
representative of the partnership not working under the supervision or
direction of the first partner at the time the errors, omissions,
negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance occurred, unless the first
partner was directly involved in the specific activity in which the errors,
omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance were committed by
the other partner or representative.
(c) Subsection (b) of this section does not affect any of the following:
(1) The joint and several liability of a partner for debts and obligations
of the partnership arising from any cause other than those specified in
subsection (b) of this section.
(2) The joint and several liability of a partner for any taxes owed by the
partnership...
(3) The liability of partnership assets for partnership debts and
obligations.
205. Id. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
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2. Statutory Non-compliance
To gain the benefit of limited liability, a partnership must fol-
low the proper registration and renewal procedures, 20 which
means filing with the Secretary of State's office.208 Presumably,
failure to do so or an incomplete filing would mean the loss of lim-
ited liability.20 9 The ultimate result is that the organization is
treated as a partnership for the period of non-compliance. 210 This
is the only possible result, as the state is providing the members of
the organization with limited liability through the registration
process. It only makes sense that non-compliance would render a
loss of limited liability, creating a partnership by operation of
law.2 11
3. Partnership by Estoppel
Even though the statute abrogates many of the statutory
rules of partnership liability, a limited liability partnership could
become a partnership by estoppel.2 12 This occurs where the LLP
or its partners hold themselves out as a normal partnership in
207. See supra note 203.
208. See supra note 203.
209. See supra note 203. A loss of limited liability is likely because the LLP is
not technically an LLP until registered. If it is not registered properly, then the
parties would still fit the definition of a partnership. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-36
(1993). This is akin to personal liability for promoters and participants in a
defectively incorporated corporation, where these parties as personal liable
during the period of defective incorporation as no entity exists. See infra notes
272, 276-77 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 209.
211. See supra note 209.
212. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-46 (1989) provides:
Partner by Estoppel.
(a) When a person, by words spoken or written, by conduct, or by
contract, represents himself, or consents to another representing him to
anyone, as a partner in an existing partnership or with one or more
persons not actual partners, he is liable to any such person to whom
such representation has been made, who has, on the faith of such
representation, given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, and if
he has made such representation or consented to its being made in a
public manner, he is liable to such person, whether the representation
has or has not been made or communicated to such person so giving
credit by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner making the
representation or consenting to its being made.
(1) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as though he were
an actual member of the partnership.
152 [Vol. 18:121
32
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/3
CREATING THE LEGAL MONSTER
some manner to a third party.2 13 Partnership by estoppel involves
violations of common law agency principles as well as those
defined in the partnership statute.214
For instance, the LLP should have the abbreviation "L.L.P."
behind its name and printed on all materials going to third per-
sons.211 If the LLP fails to file its papers at the proper time216 or
fails to represent itself to third parties .as a LLP by its name or
documents, it may be holding itself out as a normal partner-
ship.2" 7 An obvious question is what happens if limited liability
partners call each other "partners?" Third parties relying on the
title "partner" may think that the LLP is in fact a partnership.2 18
To avoid these problems, a partnership converting to an LLP must
change ads, letterheads, cards, and signs to prevent holding out
that it is still a partnership. Another device that prevents a hold-
ing out is stating in fee agreements the statutory business form
the practice has taken and the resulting limited liability.
4. The Ratification Dilemma
Another important question is what happens when an act of
malpractice committed by a partner or employee is ratified by a
partner or partners of the LLP? Here, the partnership statute and
(2) When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly with the
other persons, if any, so consenting to the contract or representation as
to incur liability, otherwise separately.
(b) When a person has been thus represented to be a partner in an
existing partnership, or with one or more persons not actual partners,
he is an agent of the persons consenting to such representations to bind
them to the same extent and in the same manner as though he were a
partner in fact, with respect to persons who rely upon the
representation. Where all the members of the existing partnership
consent to the representation, a partnership act or obligation results;
but in all other cases it is the joint act or obligation of the person acting
and the persons consenting to the representation.
See supra note 204 for comparison.
213. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-46 (1989).
214. Id.
215. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-84.3 (1993).
216. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-84.2 (1993).
217. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. See also Kaplan v.
Gibson, 192 Ga. App. 466, 385 S.E.2d 103 (1989)(where a professional
corporation was held to be a partnership by estoppel due to doctors' references to
each other as partners).
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common law agency principles apply.219 This problem should be
viewed first as to individual partners and then to the LLP itself.
Under the statute, agency principles seem to be affected to the
extent that associate attorneys and employees fall under the stat-
ute's definition of "representative."22 ° If so, a limited liability
partner would not be bound by another partner's, associate's, or
employee's acts unless he ratified them or the partner was some-
how involved.22 1 Mere knowledge of a representative's actions
could lead to ratification if the partner does nothing after learning
about it. 222 This is where personal liability begins to attach to
219. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-42 (1989) provides:
Partnership Charged With Knowledge of or Notice to Partner.
Notice to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs, and
the knowledge of the partner acting in the particular matter, acquired
while a partner or then present to his mind, and the knowledge of any
other partner who reasonably could and should have communicated it to
the acting partner, operate as notice to or knowledge of the partnership,
except in the case of fraud on the partnership committed by or with the
consent of that partner. Id.
This section appears to raise the likelihood of partners being charge with
knowledge of their partners acts by operation of law. Those partners' subsequent
acts or lack thereof could easily be construed as a ratification or adoption of the
acting partner's activities. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-34 (1989). Another
point, it would also seem that ratification of another's act by a partner would be
included as "involvement" in the act for purposes of the limited liability section of
the statute. See supra note 204.
220. See supra notes 86 and 204 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 74, 204, and 219 and accompanying text. See also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 59-33 (1989)(giving a broad definition of knowledge and notice for
individuals and entities). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-34 (1989)(the law of
agency applies under the partnership statute). See also BLAces LAw
DicTioNARY 1261-62 (6th ed. 1990) which defines ratification in part as:
In a broad sense, the confirmation of a previous act done either by the
party himself or by another; as confirmation of a voidable act. The
affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind him, but which
was done or professedly done on his account whereby the act, as to some
or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him. Id.
It continues:
In the law of principal and agent, the adoption of and confirmation by
one person with knowledge of all material facts, of an act or contract
performed or entered into in his behalf by another who at the time
assumed without authority to act as his agent. Essence of "ratification"
by principal of act of agent is manifestation of mental determination by
principal to affirm the act, and this may be manifested by written word
or by spoken word or by conduct, or may be inferred from known
circumstances and principal's acts in relation thereto. Id. at 1262.
222. See supra note 221.
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other partners under the Limited Liability sections of the statute.
Ratification is a level of involvement and carries the force of an
official sanction.22 3 Complications arise between partners since
the statute deems that the knowledge of one partner is imputed to
the others.224 If this knowledge and subsequent conduct leads to
ratification, then the ratifying partner becomes jointly and sever-
ally liable for the other's act.225
This charge of knowledge carries over to the LLP organization
itself. If the all the limited liability partners (or those who com-
pose the controlling majority of the LLP) are charged with knowl-
edge and/or ratify someone's acts, the LLP as an entity and the
ratifiers should be jointly and severally liable.226 When all the
partners in an LLP have engaged in ratification, the prohibition of
joint and several liability should fall.227 This is especially true
where the ratification takes the form of affirmative action, which
includes acquiescence and silence. Case law can only clear up
such situations. While the LLP offers more protection than a
partnership, it is not an impenetrable organization. The creature
still stalks his creator.
5. The Professional Limited Liability Company
In 1993, the General Assembly passed the North Carolina
Limited Liability Company Act.228 Professional Limited Liability
Companies (PLLC's) are creatures of statute which operate as a
cross between corporations and partnerships.229 They resemble
corporations in that they have special filing and formality require-
223. See supra note 221.
224. See supra note 221.
225. See supra note 221.
226. See supra notes 204-21 and accompanying text. The notion here is that
the entity and all those composing it will all eventually become liable. The LLP
veil is in effect pierced although not expressly set aside. The partners by their
own actions have waived limited liability by becoming involved in the acts under
the LLP statute. Joint and severable liability stems from the LLP statute, not
the partnership statute.
227. See supra note 226.
228. N.C. GEN. STAT. Chapter 57C (1993).
229. RUSSELL M. ROBINSON, II, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION
LAw § 1.8 note 2 (4th ed., 1993 cum. supp.)(citing final report of the Joint
Committee on Limited Liability Companies of the Business Law Section and Tax
Section of the North Carolina Bar Association).
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ments 230 and have members and managers instead of partners.23 1
But, PLLC's can be taxed as partnerships under state and federal
law if they take only two of the four characteristics of a corpora-
tion: limited liability, centralized management, free transferabil-
ity of interests, and continuity of life.232 Under the North
Carolina statute, every LLC and PLLC member has limited liabil-
ity,233 so the choice of which other characteristic to take requires
careful consideration. Members' and managers' liability is limited
to the obligations they personally guarantee, their own acts, the
acts of those working under them, and those acts in which they
are directly involved. However, the PLLC section applies limited
liability only to acts of malpractice in a PLLC and the LLC section
applies to all other situations in PLLC's and LLC's.234
230. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-20 to 57C-1-29 (1993). See also N.C. GEN.
STAT. Chapter 55B and § 57C-2-01 (1993). Every PLLC must also register itself
with the North Carolina State Bar as a PLLC.
231. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-1-03 (1993).
232. See REV. RuL. 93-38, 1993-21 I.R.B. 4.
233. Id. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
234. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-30 (a) (1993). For LLC's the section provides in
part:
Liability to third parties of members and managers (a) A person who is
a member or manager, or both, of a limited liability company is not
liable for the obligations of a limited liability company solely by reason
of being a member or manager or both, and does not become so by
participating, in whatever capacity, in the management or control of the
business. A member or manager may, however, become personally
liable by reason of his or her own acts or conduct.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-01 (c) (1993). This provides for PLLC members and
managers in part:
Purposes
(c).. A member or manager of a professional limited liability company is
not individually liable for debts and obligations of the professional
limited liability company arising from errors, omissions, negligence,
incompetence, or malfeasance committed in the course of the
professional limited liability company's business by another member or
manager or a representative of the professional limited liability
company not working under the supervision or direction of the first
member or manager at the time the errors, omissions, negligence,
incompetence, or malfeasance occurred, unless the first member or
manager was directly involved in the specific activity in which the
errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance were
committed by the other member or manager or representative.
See also infra notes 239-51 and accompanying text. These two sections operate
together under the statute. Obviously, the first statute applies to LLC's and
PLLC's and the second only to PLLC's, but this arrangement sets up the back
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Despite the fact that all LLC statutes say that in a suit
against an LLC, members are improper parties,2 35 the PLLC label
is not an impenetrable wall that protects members and managers
by keeping the creature at bay. North Carolina law allows "veil
piercing" of PLLC's similar to that of corporations.23 6 Partnership
by estoppe1237 and statutory non-compliance 238 also allow penetra-
tion of the corporate wall. From a practical standpoint, these the-
ories of liability remove the PLLC shield and make the improper
party language irrelevant because the plaintiff is attempting to
show the entity itself is not operating as a PLLC but as an alter
ego or other business form and cannot claim the statutory
privilege.
6. Piercing the Veil
Applying corporate law's "piercing the veil" theory to the LLC
and PLLC liability sections shows that the likely result is the set-
ting aside of the PLLC shield.239 Members and managers of a
PLLC can still be personally liable in certain situations for acts of
malpractice committed by another party in the PLLC. Some other
states expressly state in amendments to their LLC statutes that
the members and managers of an LLC can be held personally ha-
door through which a party can pierce the veil of a PLLC. The PLLC statute
§ 57C-2-01 (c) only applies where the parties are engaged in the "course" of the
PLLC's business, which is expressly the rendition of professional services. For
purposes and activities other than the rendition of legal services and
malpractice, i.e. the entity's operational organization and operations, the first
LLC statute § 57C-3-30 will apply. So the PLLC has protection in the practice
and business areas. But by using the first LLC statute to remove the limited
liability shield solely on the basis of organization and business operations, not on
the basis of the PRACTICE of law, the PLLC's limited liability status is lost, then
later, liability for malpractice can be asserted.
235. 2 NICHOLAS G. KARAMBELAS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 5.04 (1994);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-30 (1993). Note that managers are proper parties
through negative implication.
236. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-30 (1993). See supra note 234.
237. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
238. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-20 (1993).
239. See, 2 NICHOLAS G. KARAMBELAS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 5.04
(1994); LIRIY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEITANGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEITANGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 12.03 (1992). See supra note 234. The statutes
concerned here are §§ 57C-3-30 and 57C-2-01. The first applies to the
organizational and control structure of the PLLC. The second refers ONLY to the
malpractice liability of the parties. By using the first statute to pierce, you
destroy the applicability of the second. See infra notes 240-51 and accompanying
text.
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ble on LLC liabilities through corporate law "piercing the veil"
theory.240 These states use corporate common law theory as the
law used in piercing a LLC. 2
41
While North Carolina has not yet amended its statute to pro-
vide such clear guidance, the statute nevertheless allows the
application of veil piercing theory. The pierce occurs by striking
down the PLLC solely on the basis of its organizational structure
and controlling parties, which destroys the PLLC status; then the
plaintiff attempts to attach liability for malpractice. The LLC lia-
bility section notes that a member or manager does not become
liable for the obligations of the LLC "solely" by reason of their
position in the LLC.242 However, a member or manager may be
"personally liable by reasons of his own acts or conduct." Here,
the party's "conduct" that is attacked is the organization and con-
trol of the business as opposed to the actual practice of law.243
The party's "acts or conduct" in relation to the business, as
opposed to the practice of law, is key here because North Caro-
240. RiBSTEIN AND KEITANGE supra note 239, § 12.03 (Larry E. Ribstein, 1995
cum. supp.)(citing Cal. Corp. Code § 17101 (1994)); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 31,
§ 645 (3) (1995); W. Va. Code § 31-1A-33 (1995).
241. RiBSTEiN AND KEITANGE supra note 239, § 12.03 (Larry E. Ribstein, 1995
cum. supp.)
242. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-30 (1993). See supra note 234. This is where the
piercing begins. You look only at the organization and operations of the entity
and at who controls those actions. This organizational set up and the parties'
control actions will play the major role.
243. See supra note 242. Here, the piercing attempt is not based on the party's
practice of law. Rather, the focus is on the business entity and the controlling
parties. You look at those first, at the conduct of the parties in relation to the
operating and organizational structure of the business aside from their practice
of law. You pierce solely on the basis of the organizational structure and the
party's own control conduct. This business activity and organization is the
"conduct" you want show. You are looking at the how the entity is set up and
how the parties ran it as a business. If you look at the practice of law, you will
fall into the "ordinary course of business" language in the PLLC liability section
of § 57C-2-01, making a pierce impossible. Avoiding this section is vital, as it
only extends limited liability for acts occurring during the rendition of
professional services. So you do not attack the rendition of services, but the
business set up and conduct of the parties and the entity. This is essentially a
bootstrapping method, where you avoid the malpractice limited liability by
attacking the control and operation of the business form on totally separate
grounds, then attacking malpractice after limited liability is removed. See supra
note 234. At this first stage you are not attacking the professional services
rendered, but the way the business entity itself is set up and run. Once the veil
is pierced, then you assert professional liability. Of course, to pierce you must
meet the required elements. See infra notes 244 - 251 and accompanying text
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lina's corporation veil piercing theory is solely dependent on a
party's business conduct. 244 As such, one should pierce the corpo-
rate veil to remove entity liability in a malpractice claim.
Generally, the corporate entity is disregarded where a corpo-
ration is operated as an instrumentality or alter ego of the sole or
dominant shareholder and as a shield for his activity from
declared public policy or statute.245 The entity and the share-
holder are then treated as one.246 This is an equitable doctrine
that is applied flexibly to serve justice. 247 The major elements are
as follows:
1. Control-not majority or complete stock control, but complete
domination, not only of finances, but policy and business practices
in respect to the transaction attacked so the corporate entity as to
transaction attacked had no separate mind; and,
2. The control is used perpetuate the fraud, wrong, violation of
statute or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act;
and,
3. The control and breach of duty must be the proximate cause of
the injury complained of.248
When examining these elements, courts look to a non-exclu-
sive list of other guiding factors that point toward the corporation
being an alter ego, including, inadequate capitalization, non-com-
pliance with corporate formalities, complete domination and con-
trol of the corporation so that it has no independent identity, and
excessive fragmentation of a single enterprise into separate corpo-
rations.24 9 The absence or presence of any factors is not determi-
native, because courts look to a combination of factors that, when
taken together with injustice or abuse of corporate privilege, show
244. See Glenn v. Wagner, 313 N.C. 450, 329 S.E.2d 326 (1985); Henderson v.
Security Mortgage and Finance Company, 273 N.C. 253, 160 S.E.2d 39 (1968); B-
W Acceptance Corp. v. Spencer, 268 N.C. 1, 149 S.E.2d 570 (1966); Atlantic
Tobacco Co. v. Honeycutt, 101 N.C. App. 160, 398 S.E.2d 641 (1990). All of these
cases look to the way the parties organized and operated the corporation.
Domination is a central issue. This is the same type of conduct you must
examine under the LLC section before you examine liability from the rendition of
professional services. See supra notes 242 - 243 and accompanying text.
245. See Glenn, 313 N.C. 450, 329 S.E.2d 326; Henderson, 273 N.C. 253, 160
S.E.2d 39; B-W Acceptance Corp., 268 N.C. 1, 149 S.E.2d 570; Atlantic Tobacco
Co., 101 N.C. App. 160, 398 S.E.2d 641.
246. See supra notes 242-43.
247. See supra notes 242-43.
248. B-WAcceptance Corp., 268 N.C. 1, 149 S.E.2d 570.
249. Glenn, 313 N.C. 450, 329 S.E.2d 326; Atlantic Tobacco Co., 101 N.C. App.
160, 398 S.E.2d 641.
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the entity had no separate existence or mind.25 ° Consequently,
the veil piercing case law of North Carolina concentrates mainly
on the actor's conduct regarding the business.251
Having explained what law applies to pierce the veil, how is
this law- allowed into the LLC statute? The critical language of
the LLC statute that applies corporate veil piercing case law to
LLC's states that the liability of members and managers of a lim-
ited liability company organized and existing under this Chapter
shall at all times be determined solely and exclusively by this
Chapter and the laws of this State.252 On first reading, this word-
ing appears to restrict determination of liability solely to the stat-
ute, but a careful reading of the last several words seems to
expand the scope of liability beyond the statute.25 3 The words
"and the laws of this State" are conjunctively connected to the
restricted language in the statute.25 4 It would seem that this last
phrase significantly broadens the scope of applicable law to the
entire case law of North Carolina, which includes corporate veil
piercing case law.255 While this language is not a crystal clear
enumeration, it is definitely an expansive concept.
From a policy standpoint, it makes sense that some device
exists to set aside the PLLC's limited liability. The PLLC is an
entity that lies on the middle ground between a corporation and a
partnership but receives the preferred legal benefits of each.256
PLLC participants benefit because they enjoy more protection
than partners in a partnership257 with less organizational hassles
than a corporation.258 However, where attorneys associate them-
selves together and use this business form to practice law, they
should not be able to avoid personal liability based on the acts of
their cohorts. Especially where the entity is run as their own alter
ego.
250. See supra note 249.
251. See supra note 244. These cases support the concentration on conduct
through espousing elements that are conduct based. Id. See supra notes 234 and
239-50 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
253. See ROBISON supra note 229, § 1.8 note 14. The author states that veil
piercing applies to LLC's based on this section.
254. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
258. See N.C. GEN. STAT. Chapters 55 and 55B (1993).
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The alter ego scenario is particularly likely where the PLLC is
organized and operated like a close corporation.259 Generally, as
shown by North Carolina case law, close corporations bare the
brunt of piercings. 260 This is because North Carolina's corporate
veil piercing theory is geared for situations where a sole or domi-
nant shareholder, or small group, runs the corporation as an alter
ego or instrumentality.261 Typically, this happens in the close cor-
poration setting because of the control one individual or a small
group is able to exercise unchallenged.2 62 Consequently, PLLC's
run a smaller risk of being pierced as opposed to smaller ones.
7. Partnership by Estoppel
In a sense, partnership by estoppel is another form of veil
piercing. It is another way to hold participants in the firm person-
ally liable for the actions of others. The members and managers of
a PLLC can hold the organization out as a partnership, and
accordingly, the legislature has expressed its concern that the
public know what business form they are dealing with.263 By the
terms of the statute, the PLLC should have the abbreviation
"PLLC" behind its name, which would include all printed materi-
als sent to third persons.26 4 The idea is to put others on notice of
the business form being used. But a PLLC is still subject to being
held a partnership by estoppel.
Even though the PLLC is registered with the state, partner-
ship by estoppel can still occur. Under the North Carolina stat-
utes, a person or entity that holds himself out as a partner or a
partnership does not have to actually be an actual partner or an
actual, existing partnership.26 5 Essentially, all that matters is
that a party or entity somehow makes a representation to another
who relies upon it to his detriment.266 Although North Carolina
has no reported cases on the subject, case law from other states
confirms the theory that a PLLC could be treated as a partnership
259. See RIBSTEiN & KEITANGE, supra note 240. See also supra note 245.
260. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
263. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-02 (c) (1993). A law firm doing business as a
PLLC must register with the State Bar.
264. See supra note 263.
265. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. See also Volkman v. D.P.
Assocs., 48 N.C. App. 155, 268 S.E.2d 265 (1980).
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in situations where there has been a holding out that the PLLC is
a partnership.267
The danger of partnership by estoppel rises mainly out of two
events in time. The first is the dangerous transition period where
firms convert from partnerships into a PLLC. Failing to change
stationery, advertisements, business cards, pleadings, and office
forms could be considered a holding out to the public and the
court. A second danger arises where participants in the PLLC
continue to address controlling attorneys as "partners."26 8
Although this a term of tradition, it can be misleading to lay per-
sons, who do not know what the PLLC abbreviations mean.269
Appropriate risk management can alleviate such problems over
time.
8. Statutory Non-Compliance
Also related to veil piercing is the resulting personal liability
that arises from failure to comply with the PLLC filing require-
ments. A PLLC is not an organization until its articles of organi-
zation are properly and officially filed with the secretary of
state.270 A plaintiff should be able to attack the articles them-
selves to show they are somehow defective. Although the statute
gives no clear punishment for ineffective filing, the result would
have to be loss of the statutory shield and personal liability for
those transacting the PLLC business. This is true for two reasons:
1. The statutory language implies that personal liability for PLLC
liabilities would result,271 and 2. corporate law holds that ineffec-
tive filing leads to personal liability.27 2
The statute places personal liability on those transacting
PLLC business during the time of ineffective filing by implica-
tion. 3 The "...proposed organization becomes a limited liability
company" only "When the Secretary of State files the articles of
267. See Kaplan v. Gibson, 192 Ga. App. 466, 385 S.E.2d 103 (1989). This case
dealt with a group of doctors who had formed a professional corporation but
continued to call one another partners in public. Id. The court held the doctors
to a partnership by estoppel based upon those representations. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. N.C. GEN. STAT. 57C-2-20 (1993).
271. Id.
272. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-03 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-03 Official
Comment 5 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-04 North Carolina Commentary
(1993).
273. See supra note 271.
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organization.. ." 2 74 "Filing of the articles by the Secretary of State
is conclusive evidence of the organization... Clearly, this lan-
guage stands for the notion that unless the articles are in proper
form and filed, there is no PLLC. But even though the statute
fails to set out a clear rule of participants' liability during the time
of ineffective filing, it only makes since that the participants
would not enjoy the benefit of limited liability until the articles
are filed properly.
Bolstering this personal liability concept, North Carolina cor-
porate law holds parties transacting business on behalf of an
organizing corporation personally liable on transactions.276 The
corporations statute does not clearly set this out in text, but the
comments to the statute do make clear that case law is to guide
courts in this area and case law clearly reflects that participants
have no limited liability on transactions that occur during a period
of ineffective filing.2 7 7 The idea of attacking an entity's docu-
mentational existence is by no means a novel one.
9. PLLC Summary
What is critical to remember is that the LLC statute holds
that a member, not a manager, is an improper party in any suit
against the LLC.271 To bring members into a suit against the
LLC, the above theories should serve to set aside the LLC shield.
So the new business forms offer some shelter from the crea-
ture's onslaught, but the protection is not a fortress, or as com-
plete as it appears on first glance. Using his intelligence, cunning,
strength, and stamina, the creature will find ways inside.
V. CONCLUSION
Legal malpractice is a single skin covering many different
theories of liability. The scope of liability continues to evolve.
New ways of defining old legal duties, larger liability, and new
claims for damages are strengthening a plaintiff's position. Attor-
neys hold the power to halt expansion by altering their conduct
and management styles; so far they have failed to do so. Instead,
they seek shelter from angry and disappointed clients in new busi-
ness forms that offer more protection than did previous forms.
274. See supra note 271.
275. See supra note 271.
276. See supra note 272.
277. See supra note 272.
278. See supra note 235.
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Awareness is the key. Awareness of one's own acts and awareness
of the expanding scope of liability. Whether wrongful acts are
inadvertent or intentional, they continue to breathe life into the
malpractice monster.
Gregory Huffman
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